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Flowers as
'free beauties of nature'
Patrick Hutchings
Beauty is Ihe form of fmalily in an object. so far as
perceived in it apart from the represenJation ofan end.
Immanuel Kant'
Rowers are for Kant the prime example of free beauty. Indeed Kant's
distinction between free beauty ,pulchritudo vaga, and beauty which is merely
dependent,pulchritudo adhaerens. almost depends on our seeing flowers as he
would have us see them. The prime example seems to set the sense of the idea.
Thedistinction between the two kinds ofbeauty may be seen from anumber
of poinlS of view:
a) pulchritudo vaga may be secn as set up in opposition to the neo-
Classical aesthetic in which 'a beautiful instance or example of X'
tcnded lO be seen eo ipso as 'a beautiful x'. Much of Sir Joshua
Reynolds' talk of central form in the Discourses seems to recom-
mend this elision from 'a beautiful example' to 'a beautiful',
simpliciter.
b) pulchritudo vaga may be seen as the key to abstract art (a point
which I have argued elsewhere). And. of course, Kant had seen no
abstract art-and had to talk, a little unconvincingly perhaps, about
the 'absolute' beauties of wall-paper.
The famous passage of Kant's third critique reads as follows:
Flowers are free beauties ofnature. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows
Ihe true nature of a nower. and even he. while recognizing in Ihe flower the
reproductive organ ofthe plant. pays no attention to this natural end when using
his taste to judge of its beauty. Hence no perfection of any kind-no internal
finality. as somelhing to which Ihe arrangement of Ihe manifold is relatcd-
underlies Ihis judgement. Many birds (lhe parrot. the humming-bird. Ihe bird
of paradise), and a number of crustacea, are self-subsisting beauties which are
not appurtenant to any object defined wilh respect to its end. but please freely
and on their own account. So designs a/a grecque. foliage for framework or on
wall-papers. &c.• have no intrinsic meaning; Ihey represent nolhing-no
Object under a defmite concept--and arc free beauties. (CJ.• p.72)
The essence of pulchritudo vaga is. with respect to judgemenlS of taste, a
prescinding by the person making the judgement from the end, even if this is
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manifest, of the thing judged beautiful. To put it in Aristotelian ternlS, the
formal cause in cascs of beauty must be severed from the final causc. This is
at once problematic, and often as not taken as self-evident. Let us look at a
few-<>f innumerable possible-poetic uibutes to flowers, which scem to take
Kant's idea as eminently evident. Perhaps the most theoretical, and most
Kantian notion, comes from W.H. Auden. Heis associating the nine islands
which the sailors in Tennyson's Voyage o/Maeldune visit, with nine ideas: two
concern us here:
The Isle of Flowers
but no fruits
The Isle of Fruits
Art
Science2
SCI,:II~ ~ unites formal and final causes; art is 'flowers but no fruits': finality is
prescin. "d from. And for Kant art is the reversc of science.
l'be seventeenth-century German mystic Angelus Silesius wrote:
Die Ros' ist ohn warum
sie bliihet weil sie bliihel.
The Rose has no reason why
she blooms because she blooms.]
This notion, very clearly Kantian before Kant, was complicated by Garcia
Lorca in the twentieth century:
La rosa
No buscaba ni ciencia ni sombra
confin de carne y sueiio
buscaba olra cosa
The rose
was not searching for science or darkness
borderline of nesh and dreams
it was searching for something else •
If science is end-oriented, and prescinding from ends is a kind of elccted-
darkness, then is the otra cosa, the 'something elsc', her own beauty, simply?
Is it her own beauty isolated, as in a dream, from the structures of the world
which the rose seeks? One may be providing a too convenient Kantian reading
of Lorca-but it is convenient for our prescnt purposcs.
Extremelyconveniem indeed is a fragmentofpoctry by Edward Saavedra:
it is a little more discursive than the Lorca or the Angelus Silesius:
Lost inside the labyrinth of the rose,
I look for meaning, find only beauty
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10 bloom and fade is thc rosc's dUly
bUI why?-it ncither asks nor knows.'
This is so Kantian that we might take it as made to order, a bespoke passage.
What we might know from botanising, we must forget, prescind from, in
ajudgement of the rose as a free beauty. One more quotation from Rilke sums
this up:
... c'eSI un monde qui loume en rond
pour que son calm centre ose
Ie rond repos de 1a ronde rose.6
The whole of the world's teleology is suspended, and the world dares to be
as perfectly pointless as the rose, to be resolved into its 'rond repose', the
perfect circles of Aristotle's cosmology become the softer circIings of the
flower.
Kant's prescinding in judgements of beauty both from finality and from
knowledge of finality is instanced poetically; and is instanced by what even
begins to look like specific reference to Kant, again and again. The object
which one judges beautiful has such a prescinding imputed, poetically, to it,
itself. This prcscinding, then, defines the object, at least for the poet.
The trouble is, as Popperians, we have been taught to distrust the piling-up
of confirming instances. What about a disconfrrming one?
The genesis of the present paper was an exhibition of Mapplelhorpc's
Flowers? at the Australian National Gallery Drillhall Annex. I saw
Mapplcthorpc's flowers as decidedly sexy. The question of COillse is: are
they? Or docs Mapplethorpe's reputation nudge one too far towards making
one see them so?
Whatever the answer to this question may be, someone who knows Kant's
passage about flowers as free beauties can be brought up to a round turn, even
if only momenlly, by Mapplethorpe's flower photographs. I know this,
because I was. Should I have been? The answer to this question constitutes
most of the rest of this paper, which is less an argument than what Kant might
call 'a demonstration, as in anatomy' (CJ., p.2IO).
... But only with the roses plays;
And them does lell
What color besl becomes thcm, and what smell.'
The flower is a symbol, oftener than not perhaps, of innocence; or even of
a kind of pre-sexual, pre-concupiscent state; so the Blessed Virgin has her
rosary, Sl Joseph his lily, and so on.
Even fruilfulness, which entails generation (if not, among vegetables,
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concupiscence) can be linked to innocence. Witness Andrew Marvell in 'The
Garden':
What wond'rous life is this I lead!
Ripe apples drop about my head;
The luscious clusters of the vine
Upon my mouth do crush their wine;
The nectarine, and curious peach
Into my hands themselves do reach;
Stumbling on melons, as I pass,
Ensnared with Oowers, I fallon grass.
Meanwhile the mind, from pleasure less,
Withdraws into its happiness:
The mind, that ocean where each kind
Does straight its own resemblance find;
Yet it creates, transcending these,
Far other worlds, and other seas;
Annihilating all that's made
To a green thought in a green shade.
'Ensnared with flowers' suggests an-innocent-seduction; itself a para-
dox but:
I fall on grass
and innocence is madesureofin this fall, 'grass' being proleptic of the famous:
Annihilating all that's made
To a green thought in a green shade
'Grccn' here is nOljusllhe usual symbol of hope, bUl ofa kind ofblamelessness
surcly: a lapse into thc prclapsarian is thc essence oflhisannihilation. The lillie
fall to the grccnsward undoes the Fall itself.
But Marvell is the authorofa line that Mapplclhorpe mighl be seen to inter-
text with. In 'To his Coy Mistress', which begins 'Had we but world enough,
and time, This coyness, lady, were no crime', Marvell writes:
My vegetable love should grow
Vaster than empires and more slow.'
The Marvell poem 'To his Coy Mistress' is an urging to some kind of
congress not as 'innocent' as that of vegetables, and no bees are indicaled as
go-betwccns, unless the poem itself is that bee. Reading Marvell's 'To his Coy
Mistress' one is reminded of Bemini'sDaphne caught in the very moment of
her beginning to become a trcc. Desire is about to be frozen-into botany?
Mapplctho'l'C's plate 15 in Some Women by MapplethorpelO makes the
equivocal useof' vcgetable' for/ove into a visual pun. Butthere is no innocence
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in Mapplethorpe. Marvell's poem might be provoking the cold refusal of
Mapplethorpe's plate 12; innocence here is indoubt,on both sides. Is this pose
a refusal, or the contrary, a prompting?
Both Joan Didion in her preface to Some Women by Mapplethorpe and
Bruce Chatwin in his to Lady: Lisa Lyon ll remark that, with his camera,
Mapplethorpe does the same to flowers as to women. Didion writes:
One question: If Robert Mapplethorpc's 'subjects' here are women,
what then is his subject?
And she goes on:
His subject is the same as it was when his •subjects , were the men in
leather. or the nowers ...
Read in text and context, Didion's 'subject' is not intended as a neutral
pointer-as in a noncommittal caption-but, as it were, as 'subjection', and
that as in 'the sexual dreams of imperial England'. There is a coloni7..<ltion of
the subject, and a perverse one at that, which she comments on with due
asperity. The same asperity is there in the description which a woman painter
friend of mine used of Mapplethorpe, 'a gay fascist'. Mapplethorpe gives his
subjects a curious rigidity and elegance. And one recalls the-dangerous-
elegance of the fascist poses and uniforms. Elegance there was a function, as
ever, of power. In his lens' eye, the power is his, to pose, and to fascinate.
Chatwin writes in his preface t? Lady: Lisa Lyon:
[Mapplethorpc's) portraits of nowers arc somehow inLer-changeable
with his portraits of society women. 12
But it is not at all a<; clear a case as the society-portrait might be. Chatwin
had already written,
At the behest of her doting master, he [Mapplethorpc) got a street
mongrel to pose as if she were Pauline Borghese by Canova.
'Street mongrel' is less elegant than the equivocal cool of Canova's neo-
Classical sculpture. Butone recalls Starobinski's remark about neo-Classical
art:
The art of the period frequently represented psyche as the soul; but what
it really depicted wa~ adolescent nakedness offered up to a desire that
was not of the sou1. 13
We have wandered a lillIe from our topic? Rowers have a sex life, but no
awareness, no concupiscence, and as far as we know, none of the kind of
awareness that would be a precondition ofdesire orofconcupiscence. Rowers
have no souls, or only vegetable ones.
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What happens when one secs a Mapplethorpe flower photograph is a
transfer ofaffect. His reputation is such, orthe powerof his images is such, that
we project our sexual desireon to things which themselves have no desire. That
is, we run counter to Kant's intentions with respect La our taking flowers as
'frec beauties' in at least two ways:
We (i) advert to their function, (ii) to their function specifically as sexual
apparatus. And this is bolaIlical knowledge, a suppression of which at least
seems for Kant to be a precondition for taking flowers as free beauties. Neither
function in general may be thought of in a pulchritudo vaga context, nor a
fortiori any specific function. To transfer our affect/concupiscence about sex
to flowers is to heap perversity upon logical and epistemological impropriety,
at least as Kant conceives the structure of the Aesthetic.
This perversity, is, however, common.
If flowers have no courL<;hips, nevertheless we use them in ours. Here is a
description ofa character in David Malouf's The Great World going to visit the
woman who becomes his lifelong mistress:
He was very conscious of the fact that at twenty-five he was entirely
without experience in some matters. Courtship and that-the sort of
gallantry that some fellows can manage by instinct. he had none of. But he
had a great tenderness in him. Surely ifhe let that speak it would be enough.
Still. he had anned himself, just in case, with a bunch of flowers. purple
and red anemones wrapped in pale tissue. The old girl he bought them from,
who looked after six or seven buckets in a Janeway. and sat reading the Bible
all day on a folding stool. had recommended them as the freshest at this time
of the week. and seeing how nervous he was had taken trouble with the
wrapping. The flower heads with their strong colours and black furry
centres. as if fat bumblebees were at them. just peeped out over the sky-blue
tissue. and there was a bit of ribbon. a darker blue.··
A lillie old-fashioned practical criticism could unpack a nest of ambigui-
ties, paradoxes and inversions here-but the general thrust is obvious enough.
Eric Gill, typographer, philosopher, artist and sexual athlete went well
beyond this, writing in a love leller:
What arc those lovely creatures which we delight to fill our gardens with
and to display on our tables? What are they indeed but the sex organs of the
planL~ they adorn. So that it is neither fantastic nor even an exaggeration to
say that while from one point of view the country hedgerow is filled with
savage creatures armed to the teeth-with poison and thorns and spikes and
every son ofoffensive and defensive weapon (in this respect perfect models
for all modem nations). so from another. it is nothing but an uproarious
exhibition of desire for fruitfulness and muhiplication. And having thus
become enl ightened a~ to the nature of the flowers in the field. does one then
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tum roood and say: 0 hell! what a filthy world it is? I can't imagine that such
would be the result. Rather, it seems to me, we should tum roood on all our
previous pruderies and think of ourselves as being adorned, as indeed we
are, with precious ornaments. And thus a great burden of puzzlement is
taken from the mind. And, what is more to the point; a great wave of
cheerfulness breaks over us, and of confidence and that is to say
confidingness. 15
Gill was always a special pleader, and this plea falls gratefully on the ear
only of those who are not troubled by concupiscence in relation to human
sexual function. It falls gratefully on the ear of those only who can be nudists,
both outside and in. Such innocence! It was lost with the Fall. And one is
reminded of Kant, who wrote in another context: 'Innocence is a splendid
thing, but cannot well maintain itself' .16 A piece of post-Lapsarian common
sense this is!
Contemplating the project of the paper, and looking at nowers and at
pictures of them, I was tempted tomak~ propos Gill and Mapplethorpe-
a pun on the name of the punk-rock band 'The Sex Pistols/Pistils': but,
brushing upan always-imperfect acquaintance with botany, I found that pistils,
unlike pistols are female, and so not phallic at all.
The phallic nower is all-over, however, botany or no botany: one may cite
a recent Hestia bra advertisement with a phallic nower as its sub-text, up on
billboards in Melbourne.
Flowers can be phallic or vaginal. And they are often taken to be the latter
by some when it is a mallerofGeorgia O'Keefe's nower-picturcs. O'Keefe in
a TV interview on United States Public Broadcasting said of people who saw
her nowers as sexual symbols: 'They were talking about themselves, not about
me'.
This assorts less than well with the title of a recent book of photographs of
nowers published in Australia by Lariane Fonseca,lfPassion were a Flower. I?
It is not one. But we impute our passions by metonymy and metaphor to
pac;sionless entilies. Entities which, properly to be read as free beauties, must
be seen not as merely non-concupiscent (because that question cannot arise for
them) but,as it were, as totally non-functional, and this with regard totheirown
function as sexual parts of plants.
Kant is, as it were, an ultimate Puritan. And he is cooler than the coolest
nco-Classicism of his time, that reworking of a Greek idealization which
adverts, willy nilly, to final as much as to formal causes. A beautiful nower is
for Kant, not as it might be for Sir Joshua Reynolds, a realised central-form,
a fine example of its sort, and so, beautiful. It is, just, beautiful, for Kant: as
form-without-telos. Kant writes, early on in the third critique:
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Raben Mapplclhorpc
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Lariane Fonseca, If Passion were a Flower
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By [a critique of aesthetic judgement) is meant the faculty of estimating
formal finalily (otherwise called subjective), by the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure, by [a critique of teleological judgement is meant) the estimat-
ing the real fmality (objective) of nature by understanding and reason.
(C. J., p.34, italic added.)
Here would seem to lie the germ of art-for-art's-sake, or of flowers as
functionless-forms-for-fancy's-fascination.
A free beauty is free for Kant wilh respect to ilS own ends, and bound only
to a special human end: contemplation. It is bound to lhe 'end' of lhe inducing
of a free play of the cognitive faculties in what is-essential1y-a mere
cognition, or, even, a less-than-cognition. Roger Fry sums up Kant's point
more sharply, perhaps, than Kant himself. He writes:
Biologically speaking, art is a blasphemy. We were given eyes to see
things, not to look at them.
and the distinction between seeing and looking is of the essence. Fry goes on:
Life takes care that we all learn the lesson thoroughly, so that at a very
early age we have acquired a very considerable ignorance of visual
appearances. We have learned the meaning-for-life of appearances so
well that we understand them, as it were in shorthand. The subtlest
differences of appearance that have utility-value continue to be appreci-
ated, while large and important visual characters, provided they are
useless for life, will pass unnoticed.11
The flower docs not know ilS own use: it just has it If we are to know a
flower aeslhetically, then we must be as unknowing as it is. Formal cause must
be severed from final: and a new, aesthetic finality must be made to supervene
on lhe old biological one. Rowers arc not for fruiting,lhey are there to induce
'the free play of the cognitive faculties' in what is, almost, are-recognition
which is no-cognition: a look, wilhout even lhe ulterior motive of what is
looked at, ilSelf. A motive built in to the thing itself, which aslhetic vision must
excise. Form and te/os must be sundered.
Aesthetically, it might seem thatlhe innocent pleasures of botanising are
not innocent enough for the aesthetic. For lhe knowing person, a flower-show
can turn into, if not an orgy quite, at least somelhing which loses the precise
freedom of the aesthetic, which is: to be above and beyond function. The
aesthetic is beyond not only lhe functions imputed by metaphor or metonymy,
but above those implicit or immanent in the aesthetic object itself as a mere
thing in the world.
The botanist, to the aeslhetician, can seem as perverse as Mapplethorpe?
Or, as perverse, at a slightly more elevated level of perversity?
The mind lhal ocean where each kind
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Does straight is own resemblance fmd ...
Knowledge in theJ udaco-Christian tradition is suspect in the third chapter
of Genesis Adam and Eve fall-the occasion of the Fall is disobedience, and
an apple. One recalls Milton's opening chiasmus in Paradise Lost:
Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world ...
where the 'fruit' is the serpent's apple, as well as the consequence of the
disobedience: and the fruit is death.
But in Genesis, what tempted Adam and Eve was knowledge-knowledge
of good and evil-and the first consequence of the FalVThe Knowledge, was
concupiscence-known for the first time. And the concupiscence was known
as and in a consciousness of their nakedness. For without concupiscence
nakedness would be unremarkable.
From ArisLOtle to Kant, knowledge in the 'scientific' sense had been
knowledge by causes, and Aristotle reckoned there to be four of these, te/os
being not the least interesting. After Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' the basis
of knowledge moved 'in', 'in' to the subject, and into a peculiar kind of con-
naturality between the structuring, transcendental-ego and the appearances
which it structures.
What is crucial, however, for the aesthetic is that part of an object's
structure,that is,the nexus between form and Ie/OS, must be put aside; and form
alone and its congeniality with the mind must be attended to. This isanoddkind
of connaturality of taking of a form as, aesthetically, good when in the case in
question the thing must be taken as good-for-nothing, since nothing that it is
good for may be taken into account. 19 Perhaps it is a matter merely of
suspending the practical in favour of the contemplative?
And. again, if the suspension of utility is the point. the metapoint may be
that metaphor is being made way for-metaphor, with its metonymies, and
even. possibly, its perversions? It may be that real botany is unaesthetic, but
Marvell's playful 'vegetable love' is perfectly proper.
Aesthetic contemplation, in the Kantian sense, is only, perhaps. a meta-
connaturality, a reOexion not upon structure but on the inexorability of the
structuring, when this is considered in a privileged, aesthetic example. And
there is Kant's long 'Critique ofTelcology, to be considered before we can be
quite sure of the basis of his preference for pu/chritudo vaga with its
prescension from final causes, over pu/chritudo adhaerens which manifests
form as a function of function. All this needs to be gone into-though it will
not be done in this paper, which is itself a shade more 'aesthetic' than it is
argumentative.
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Here I am offering only a suggestion, something less than an argument, that
inter-texting Kant on flowers and on pulchritudo vaga with Genesis we may
have hit upon an unconscious motive for Kant's aesthetic purism-his aes-
thetic Puritanism.
Mapplcthorpcs's flowers, or our psychological sets in reading them, raise
issues of the flowers' final causes, in the first place, and invite perverse
projection in the sccond. And apropos MappIcthorpc's perversity, or ours in
reading him as we do, an interesting further issue presents itself: is Duchamp's
Bride even more curious again than a Mapplcthorpe photograph of a rose, by
a whole order of magnitude, because it a<;cribes carnality to the metallic and
purely mechanical? Had Duchamp already trumped Mapplethorpe's flowers?
And bettered a perversity in so doing?
Kant's requiring us to prescind from flowers' final causes suggests that, for
Kant in his aesthetic, knowledge, knowledge by causes, is as infected as
knowledge is in Genesis: with knowledge comes concupiscence.The aesthetic
flees this concupiscence.
By our not adverting to what a thing is for we-and it-achieve a kind of
ontological innocence which is a prophylactic against concupiscence. Ifwe do
not know what a thing is for, then wecannot---consciously at least-misuse it.
What has no use cannot have a misuse. The aesthetic is more pure than Pure
Practical Rea'ion could ever be. Though it must be recalled that what matters
for Kant in moral philosophy, is not an act's actual or presumed consequences,
but its bare form. that is, its passing the universalizability test.
Taken with the connaturality point, this suggestion, that the final cause is
somehow not to be thought of in the aesthetic, shows us a motive even behind
Kant's argument: the argument turns on a nexus between a special kind of
connaturality and a mistrusting of, traditional, teleologies. The motive mar-
ried-if we may use this term here-to the argument, shows a deep sense of
the dangers of knowledge to be present, perhaps, in Kant's thought. Rational-
ism is totally put aside in the aesthetic.
It is Genesis-and the Bible generally-which conflates mere knowledge
and carnal knowledge in a set of puns which-because of the Bible-have
entered our culture at very deep levels indeed.
Marvell, himselfa Puritan, knew all about the ambiguity and multi-valency
of flowers and fruit: Kant, a more philosophical purist, produces an aesthetic
whose essence is a prescinding from one element in the knowledge of a thing
contemplated, viz. its end; and a prescinding from the relation of this end to the
thing's form. Form alone, Kant insists, should interest us aesthetically. We
should be, at once, disinterested with respect to the aesthetic object, and
uninterested in any telos it might have, even if the Aristotelian in us cannot
fathom mere form, without respect to finality as telos.
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To put it all another way, and to conclude: if we are perverse and dirty-
minded in our readings of flower-photographs by Mapplethorpe, then both the
Bible and Kant have been there well before us. And this is the case even if their
aim has been prevention; and 'prevention' in both the ordinary and the Prayer
Book senses.
Or, to be very short about it: fig-leaves indeed!
Or, one might close with the description of a plant which seems, almost, to
have read and noted Kant I quote from a short piece in The Age on an orchid
from south-eastern Queensland, called Dendrobiumspeciosum. It is pollinated
exclusively by native bees, but:
For their cfforts, thc bees get nothing. Over time, this Dendrobium
species has developed a glamorous but, from a bec's view-point. useless
attractant. Its flowers look and smcll enticing. but producc no nccW for the
bees ...
The flowers of D. speciosum use no special ploy to attract pollinators. such
as mimicking other flowers or posing as a fcmale insect to attract a male
suitor and pollinator. They rely solely on their stunning visual appeal.10
We have, in Queensland, the freest of Kant'sjree beauties? The note on
these orchids begins with a quotation from Oscar Wilde, 'The only excuse for
making a useless thing is that one admires it, intensely'.
Even evolution can be aesthetic-at least sometimes. Aesthetically, all that
flowers do is-flower.
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